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I. INTRODUCTION 
Look around your home and think of all the possible ways a 
visiting three-year-old child could possibly injure himself: those 
uncovered outlets, that sparkling clean glass door, the hot mug of 
coffee on the table, and that unsecured bookshelf.  Then ask 
yourself this: in deciding how far to go in protecting your child 
guest from these dangers, would the fact that the three-year-old’s 
mother is right next to him affect your decision in any way? 
For the Minnesota Supreme Court, the answer is “no”—at least 
according to its opinion in Foss v. Kincade.1
Foss involved a three-year-old child who was injured when he 
tried to climb an empty, unsecured bookcase in a family friend’s 
home.
  
2  The boy’s mother was around the corner, just a few feet 
away, when the accident occurred.3  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
specifically rejected the court of appeals’ argument that the 
homeowners had no duty to protect the child due to the mother’s 
presence.4  Instead, the supreme court held that the homeowners 
had no duty to protect the child from the bookcase because it was 
clearly not reasonably foreseeable that any guest would try to climb 
it.5
 
 1. Foss ex rel. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009). 
  
 2. Id. at 319. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 322. 
 5. Id.  The court also held that discovery sanctions against the Kincades for 
disposing of the bookcase before trial were inappropriate, because the Kincades 
had already admitted that they knew it was possible the bookcase could tip over.  
Id. at 323–24. 
2
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Foreseeability is a question for the jury, we are told, unless the 
issue “is clear.”6
The only thing that is actually clear, in a more proper sense of 
the word, is that the Minnesota Supreme Court—for one reason or 
another—absolutely did not want this case to go in front of a jury. 
  So where a three-year-old child is left unsupervised 
in a room with a big, empty bookcase sitting on a carpeted floor, 
the issue “is clear.”  Even where the homeowner is well acquainted 
with the child and has characterized him as being very active, the 
issue “is clear.”  On the homeowner’s motion for summary 
judgment—where all facts and inferences must be taken in the 
light most favorable to the child—the issue “is clear.”  And even 
when the senior justice of the state’s highest court believes it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the accident may occur, the issue, still, 
“is clear.” 
Courts have frequently used the term “reasonable 
foreseeability” in the context of duty, just as the Minnesota 
Supreme Court did here, to take questions of fact away from the 
jury.  This has been recognized by legal scholars for some time, and 
is one of the main reasons the American Law Institute (“ALI”) 
specifically rejected no-duty rulings based on foreseeability in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts (“Third Restatement”).  When cases 
are decided by judges, as opposed to when they are decided by 
juries, precedent is created.7  The case becomes law, dictating how 
future cases are to be decided.  When judges create precedent on 
the basis of the undefined concept of foreseeability, they create 
easily misunderstood and totally unpredictable laws.8
This article examines Foss v. Kincade and how it exemplifies the 
pitfalls of using foreseeability as a basis for determining duty.  The 
history section covers the changes proposed in the Third 
Restatement, followed by an account of premises liability in 
Minnesota, with a particular focus on the duty owed to child 
  More people 
test their luck in the courts, dockets begin to overflow, and judges 
feel increasing pressure to quickly dismiss cases based on the catch-
all concept of foreseeability. 
 
 6. Id. at 322–23. 
 7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 8 cmt. c 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“A jury decision on the negligence issue is not 
a precedent for later cases involving different parties and is not even admissible in 
such later cases as a possible guide to later juries.”). 
 8. See generally William H. Hardie, Jr., Foreseeability: A Murky Crystal Ball for 
Predicting Liability, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 349 (1993) (arguing that the creation of 
precedent based on foreseeability creates unpredictable laws). 
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entrants.  The following section gives an in-depth look at the facts 
of Foss v. Kincade, and recounts the reasoning of the courts at each 
level.  The analysis section will look at the successes and failures of 
the supreme court’s decision, and its implications for future cases.  
Ultimately, this article will show why Minnesota courts should cease 
their use of foreseeability as a consideration in the duty element of 
negligence. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Third Restatement of Torts on Duty and Foreseeability 
The ALI takes a remarkable departure from its previous stance 
on duty in the Third Restatement.  In both the First and Second 
Restatements, foreseeability was used for determining the existence 
of a duty.9  This was the view expressed by Judge Cordozo in 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co,10 where he famously stated, “The 
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.”11  
Cordozo’s view was adopted by the First Restatement of Torts soon 
after the Palsgraf decision,12 and was subsequently adopted by many 
states, including Minnesota, which still adheres to the view today.13
 
 9. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 281 (1936); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 281 (1965); Hardie, supra note 8, at 394–95 (explaining that while the 
Restatement (First) of Torts implied an event was foreseeable if there was “an 
appreciable chance” of its occurrence, the Restatement (Second) of Torts failed to 
quantify foreseeability at all, because such a definition would limit the court’s 
broad use of the term). 
 
 10. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
 11. Id. at 344, 162 N.E. at 100. 
 12. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953).  In Palsgraf 
Revisited, Prosser points out that it was more accurately the drafters of the First 
Restatement who influenced Judge Cardozo’s opinion, rather than the other way 
around.  Cardozo was an advisor to the Restatement and had already heard the 
drafters’ debate the lower New York court’s holding in Palsgraf. Id. at 4.  When the 
case was appealed to New York’s highest court, Cordozo applied the view that had 
been argued by the majority of the Restatement drafters.  Id. at 5.  Soon after, the 
Restatement adopted the view expressed by Cordozo in Palsgraf, and even uses the 
facts of Palsgraf for one of its illustrations.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 281 
cmt. g, illus. 3 (1936).  “It is not likely that any other case in all history ever 
elevated itself by its own bootstraps in so remarkable a manner.”  Prosser, supra, at 
8. 
 13. Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 381, 95 N.W.2d 657, 664 
(1959) (“‘The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and 
risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of 
apprehension.’” (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 
N.E. 99, 100 (1928))). 
4
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In contrast, the Third Restatement completely rejects any use 
of foreseeability in the determination of duty.  The proposed final 
draft of section seven, subpart (a), reads: “[a]n actor ordinarily has 
a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates 
a risk of physical harm.”14  As clarified in the comments, this means 
that a duty is assumed to exist in the vast majority of cases, and the 
determination of liability should start with breach.15  Subpart (b) 
states that no-duty rulings are only appropriate in “exceptional 
cases,” where “articulated principle or policy” supports limiting 
liability for a particular class of actors.16  The comments and notes 
following section seven make it explicitly clear that “foreseeability 
has no role under this Section and Restatement in a determination 
that a duty exists vel non.”17
1. Problems with Duty Defined by Foreseeability 
 
  In explanation of its departure, the comments to section 
seven point to the myriad problems created by using foreseeability 
as a part of the duty determination.  The comments cite the works 
of many legal scholars who have shared similar concerns.18
First, by dismissing cases based on the lack of foreseeability, 
judges pass on issues of fact that are more appropriately decided by 
the jury.
  These 
concerns essentially go to three main problems with foreseeability-
based no-duty rulings. 
19
 
 14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7(a) (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
  Foreseeability is a particularly fact-intensive, case-by-case 
 15. Id. at cmt. a; id. at reporters’ note cmt. b. 
 16. Id. at (b). 
 17. Id. at reporters’ note cmt. i.  Although the position of the Third 
Restatement contradicts the prior restatements, it is not new in itself.  Judge 
Andrews expressed a similar view in his dissenting opinion to Palsgraf—except 
Andrews believed that foreseeability should be used to determine proximate 
cause, while the Third Restatement argues predominantly that it should be used to 
consider breach.  Id.; see also Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. 339, 347–56, 162 N.E. 99, 101–05. 
 18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7 reporters’ note 
cmt. j (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (citing Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer 
on the Patterns of Negligence, 15 LA. L. REV. 1509, 1523 (1993); Patrick J. Kelley, 
Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive Theory and 
the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1046 (2001)). 
 19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmts. i–j 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (explaining that foreseeability is a question for 
the jury whenever reasonable minds can differ and that judges should not 
substitute no duty determinations for the evaluation of the jury); John C. 
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in 
5
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determination, and small changes in the facts can have a profound 
affect on what is, or is not, deemed foreseeable.20  Plaintiffs are 
short-changed when judges decide the determinative issue of 
foreseeability on the basis of a thin fact record in the preliminary 
stages of the case.  In addition, by deciding foreseeability in the 
context of duty, judges essentially are deciding no breach, but 
without the no-reasonable-jury standard required for no breach 
limiting their discretion.21
Second, basing no-duty rulings on an indeterminate concept 
like foreseeability creates terrible precedent and undermines the 




Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 713 (2001) (“[T]he court is using the duty 
element as a platform on which it may stand in order to decide for itself the 
unreasonableness or breach issue, and thus surreptitiously to shrink the scope of 
the rule stating that the breach issue is ordinarily for the jury.”); 3 FOWLER V. 
HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 18.8 (3d ed. 2007) 
(“Reasonable foreseeability of harm is the very prototype of the question a jury 
must pass on in particularizing the standard of conduct in the case before it.”). 
  Foreseeability is so open-ended that judges 
may use it to justify almost any ruling.  It provides an easy escape by 
 20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. j (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (explaining that small changes in facts can have a 
dramatic effect on how much risk is foreseeable); John H. Marks, The Limit to 
Premises Liability for Harms Caused by “Known or Obvious” Dangers: Will it Trip and Fall 
Over the Duty-Breach Framework Emerging in the Restatement (Third) of Torts?, 38 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 1, 62 (2005) (“[S]mall differences in facts can unquantifiably alter 
the interaction of [the variables used to measure foreseeability] from one case to 
the next.  The subtle, case-specific interaction of these variables is thus typically 
‘for the jury to take into account in evaluating whether the [defendant] was 
unreasonable.’” (citations omitted)). 
 21. W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial 
Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 741 (2005) 
[hereinafter Purging Foreseeability] (“[B]y resolving duty based on analysis of 
whether the risk created by a defendant’s conduct was foreseeable, judges are 
really deciding whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable—the essence of a 
jury’s determination of breach.”); Goldberg, supra note 19, at 715 (“[C]ourts 
sometimes trade on their authority to decide the obligation question in a manner 
that takes breach questions away from the jury even when the summary 
judgment/j.n.o.v. standard is not met.”). 
 22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. j (Proposed 
Final Draft  No. 1, 2005) (explaining that no-duty holdings are purely legal 
determinations that liability should not be imposed, and that such rulings “should 
be articulated directly without obscuring references to foreseeability.”).  See also  
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns of Negligence, 53 LA L. REV. 1509, 
1523 (1993) (“[J]udges should not rely on, or hide behind, words like . . . 
foreseeable, unforeseeable . . . and whatever other magic mumbo jumbo courts 
could use to obfuscate the policies that were really at the heart of their 
decisions.”); Hardie, supra note 8, at 402 (“Using foreseeability in a flexible, case-
by-case analysis creates uncertainty by giving courts the power and method to 
decide cases without external restraint.”). 
6
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allowing judges to dispose of complex legal questions without even 
having to provide a single legal reason for doing so.23  The 
precedent created by such rulings is often so vague that that it 
provides little, if any, guidance for later cases.24  Often these 
holdings are interpreted as being much broader than the court 
intended, causing future injustice that goes relatively unnoticed.25
Third, case-specific, no-duty rulings based on the lack of 
foreseeability confuse the obligation sense of duty.
  
26  Courts will 
proclaim that each person has a duty to exercise reasonable care, 
but in the same breath, question whether the defendant owed a 
duty in that particular case.27
Removing foreseeability from the duty determination will force 
judges either to articulate the policies behind their no-duty rulings, 
or adhere to the no-reasonable-jury standard by dismissing cases as 
  Narrow, foreseeability based no-duty 
rulings that do not apply to broad categories of cases, but rather 
only to one very narrow set of facts, undermine the concept that 
every person has a duty to exercise reasonable care. 
 
 23. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV. 921, 923 
(2005) (explaining that no-duty rulings based on the lack of foreseeability are 
popular with judges because they provide an easy, yet imperfect, solution to 
complex legal dilemmas); Hardie, supra note 8, at 410 (“Application of the 
foreseeability test has become addictive because it seems to solve complex 
problems with apparent simplicity.”). 
 24. W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 
723 (2008) (“[F]oreseeability is a particularly fact-dependent determination, not 
properly given the broad effect of precedent. . . .  Indeed, such fact-specific duty 
rulings have even drawn the ire of Cardozo.” (comparing Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. 
Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 20 (1927) with Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Cp., 292 U.S. 98, 
101–02 (1934))). 
 25. Purging Foreseeability, supra note 21, at 793 (“And what if foreseeability 
hides irrational or even prejudicial reasons for deciding tort liability?  Because the 
power of foreseeability, when used in the context of duty, is so broad and so 
erratically defined, such injustices may go unnoticed and unchecked.”); Frank F. 
Vandall, Duty: The Continuing Vitality of Dean Green’s Theory, 15 Q.L.R. 343, 345 
(1995) (“The problem with such an overuse of foreseeability is that the judge may 
get confused and make a bad decision.  More importantly, the attorney may, in 
using the word foreseeability, fail to realize the important policy factors that the 
judge considers in making a decision.”).  
 26. Goldberg, supra note 19, at 716–17 (“[J]udicial decisions referring to 
matter-of-law decisions as ‘duty’ decisions necessarily confuse the distinct issue of 
duty in its obligation sense with the breach issue.  And this confusion imposes a 
cost not only on legal academics and students, but also on lawyers and judges 
trying to litigate and resolve negligence cases.”). 
 27. E.g., Widlowski v. Durkee Foods, Div. of SCM Corp., 562 N.E.2d 967, 968, 
970 (1990) (explaining that “every person owes a duty of ordinary care to all 
others . . . ,” but holding, after a lengthy analysis of foreseeability, among other 
factors, that the defendant owed no duty). 
7
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a matter of law on the basis of no-breach.  Precedent will be far 
more coherent, leading to greater stability and predictability in the 
law.  And of course, judges and professors will no longer need to 
keep their fingers crossed behind their backs when they say that 
there is a universal duty on the part of every person to exercise 
reasonable care.  
B. Premises Liability in Minnesota 
Landowner liability cases make up one of the largest 
subcategories in negligence law.28  Historically, greater protection 
was provided for the landowner’s right to use his land freely than 
for the entrant’s right to safety—but times have changed. 29  As 
society became more urbanized and relationships grew more 
complex, courts began to find landowners owed a greater duty to 
prevent the dangerous conditions on their land from causing injury 
to others. 30
The Minnesota Supreme Court did so in the 1972 decision of 
Peterson v. Balach.
  The old common law approach to premises liability, 
which limited landowner liability based on the categorical status of 
the entrant, no longer reflected societal values.  Courts attempted 
to “fix” the categorical rules by creating various exceptions, but this 
only led to greater confusion.  Hence, many states opted to modify 
or abolish the categorical approach all together. 
31  Although this move intended to clarify and 
liberalize premises liability law, the effect, if any, was short lived.32
 
 28. GLEN WEISSENBERGER & BARBARA B. MCFARLAND, THE LAW OF PREMISES 
LIABILITY § 1.1 (3d ed. 2001). 
  
Under post-Peterson law today, Judges still use the duty 
determination to limit landowner liability however they see fit—just 
without any categorical boundaries.  In fact, when it comes to child 
entrants, liability appears to be even more limited and confusing 
than it had been under the categorical approach.  Foreseeability—
and its close cousin, the obvious danger rule—are largely to blame 
for this confusing inversion in Minnesota premises liability law. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972). 
 32. For a history of Minnesota premises liability law focused on adult 
entrants, see Mike Steenson, Peterson v. Balach, Obvious Dangers, and the Duty of 
Possessors of Land in Minnesota, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1281 (2008). 
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1. Pre-Peterson Premises Liability in Minnesota 
Prior to 1972, a landowner’s duty to an entrant on his land 
depended on the entrant’s status as a trespasser, licensee, or 
invitee.33  Invitees were owed the greatest duty, while trespassers 
were owed the least—practically none at all.34
Social guests were considered licensees, not invitees.
 
35  Invitees 
only included business visitors and members of the public on land 
open to the public.36  While landowners had a duty of reasonable 
care to keep their premises safe for invitees,37 landowners only had 
a duty to warn social guests of unreasonable, yet non-obvious, 
dangers.  Landowners did not have to change or inspect their land 
to make it safe for social guests.38  Social guests took the land as 
they found it.39
 
 33. See id.  
 
 34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 329, 330, 332 (1965).  Section 329 
defines “trespasser” as one who enters or remains on the land without the 
landowner’s consent.  Id. § 329.  Section 330 defines “licensee” as one who enters 
or remains on the land with the landowner’s consent.  Id. § 330.  Section 332 
defines “invitee” as a member of the public upon land open to the public, or a 
business visitor invited on the land for reason directly or indirectly to do with 
business dealings with the landowner.  Id. § 332.  In addition, landowners owe all 
entrants a duty to refrain from willful or wanton injury.  Id. §§ 329–32. 
 35. Id. § 330, cmt. h3.  Explaining this categorization of social guests, the 
Restatement (Second) states: 
Some confusion has resulted from the fact that, although a social guest 
normally is invited, and even urged to come, he is not an “invitee,” within 
the legal meaning of that term . . . . The explanation usually given by the 
courts for the classification of social guests as licensees is that there is a 
common understanding that the guest . . . does not expect and is not 
entitled to expect that . . . precautions will be taken for his safety, in any 
manner in which the possessor does not prepare or take precautions for 
his own safety, or that of the members of his family. 
Id. 
 36. Id. § 332. 
 37. E.g., Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co., 243 Minn. 166, 66 N.W.2d 892 
(1954) (holding that the duty of reasonable care owed to invitees included 
repairing known dangerous conditions and making reasonable inspections to find 
and repair previously unknown dangerous conditions; however, the duty did not 
require landowners to warn invitees about obvious dangers, unless the landowner 
had reason to believe the invitee would not recognize the danger despite the 
obviousness).  
 38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342, cmt. d (1965) (“A possessor of 
land owes to a licensee no duty to prepare a safe place for the licensee’s reception 
or to inspect the land to discover possible or even probable dangers.”). 
 39. Roadman v. C.E. Johnson Motor Sales, 210 Minn. 59, 64, 297 N.W. 166, 
169 (1941) (“The general rule is that a mere licensee, like the trespasser, must 
take the premises as he finds them.”). 
9
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The status of an entrant was the determinative factor in the 
judge’s decision on duty.40  Judges applied these categorical 
statuses very rigidly, often leading to arbitrary and unfair results.41  
Hence, courts began to develop a variety of different exceptions to 
temper the basic rules.42  One of these exceptions was the notorious 
“open and obvious danger” rule, announced in section 343A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.43  Minnesota adopted this rule in 
1966.44
As a result of these various exceptions, landowner liability 
became a patchwork of limited duties and exceptions to those 
duties, generating extreme confusion.
 
45  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court noted this as early as 1941 in Roadman v. C.E. Johnson Motor 
Sales.46  Despite the confusion, however, the court explained, “we 
think this general principle may be gathered, that ‘the greater the 
chance of injury, the greater the precautions which must be taken 
to prevent it.’”47
 
 40. WEISSENBERGER & MCFARLAND, supra note 
 
28, § 6.1 (discussing the general 
dissatisfaction with the common law categories). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reads “A possessor of 
land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or 
condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the 
possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965) (emphasis added).  The 
ambiguity of this rule has caused a great deal of frustration.  The rule can be 
interpreted as meaning a duty only exists when harm can be anticipated despite 
the obviousness; but it can also be interpreted as meaning there is no breach of 
duty unless harm can be anticipated despite the obviousness.  John H. Marks, The 
Limit to Premises Liability for Harms Caused by “Known or Obvious” Dangers: Will it Trip 
and Fall Over the Duty-Breach Framework Emerging in the Restatement (Third) of Torts?, 
38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 4 (2005).  The effect of the former interpretation is to 
make the obviousness of the danger a threshold question decided by the judge, 
while the effect of the later interpretation is to essentially make the rule an 
instruction to the jury.  Id. at 34.  For a discussion of the interpretation of this rule 
and the effect of the Third Restatement upon it, see id. 
 44. Peterson v. W.T. Rawleigh Co., 274 Minn. 495, 496–97, 144 N.W.2d 555, 
557 (1966) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965)). 
 45. Comment, Occupier of Land Held to Owe Duty of Ordinary Care to All 
Entrants—”Invitee,” “Licensee,” and “Trespasser” Distinctions Abolished: Rowland v. 
Christian, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 426, 427 (1969) (calling the categorical approach, as 
modified by the various subcategories and exceptions, a “patchwork of legal 
classifications, by no means uniformly interpreted by the various jurisdictions.”). 
 46. 210 Minn. 59, 297 N.W. 166 (1941). 
 47. Id. at 64, 267 N.W. at 169. 
10
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a. Child Entrants Pre-Peterson 
Even before Peterson, the duty owed to child entrants did not 
depend on the status of the child.  All children were subject to the 
same standard of care—the child trespasser standard—which in 
practice was the equivalent of reasonable care.48
The child trespasser standard was articulated by the  
Minnesota Supreme Court in its 1935 decision of Gimmestad v. Rose 
Bros.
  
49  Often referred to as the “attractive nuisance doctrine,”50 the 
theory laid out the minimum elements a trespassing child needed 
to meet in order to recover.51  These elements generally accounted 
for children’s propensity to intermeddle and lower capacity to 
recognize and appreciate harm.52
 
 48. E.g., Leon Green, Landowners’ Responsibility to Children, 27 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(1948) (discussing how the attractive nuisance doctrine evolved into a duty of 
reasonable care owed to all child entrants, and correctly hypothesizing that the 
complexities of society would lead to the same standard of care being owed to 
adult entrants).  
  
 49. 194 Minn. 531, 261 N.W. 194 (1935). 
 50. The name “attractive nuisance doctrine” is a misnomer.  The name 
derived from an earlier version of the standard that required the child to have 
been enticed onto the land by the condition that caused him harm.  This 
requirement was put forth by the early Minnesota case Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul 
Railway Co. 21 Minn. 207 (1875), but later abandoned in Gimmestad, 194 Minn. 
531, 536, 261 N.W. 194, 196 (1935).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
339 cmt. b (1965) (explaining that a child no longer needs to be enticed onto the 
land by an attractive condition in order to recover). 
 51. Gimmestad, 194 Minn. 531, 536–37, 261 N.W. at 196; see also infra note 52.    
 52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 cmt. b (1965). Section 339 lays 
out the elements of the attractive nuisance doctrine as follows: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children 
trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if 
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the 
possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to 
trespass, and 
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason 
to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an 
unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such 
children, and 
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition 
or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming 
within the area made dangerous by it, and 
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the 
burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the 
risk to children involved, and 
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the 
danger or otherwise to protect the children. 
Id.  Minnesota case law frequently cites Gimmestad as the case adopting section 339, 
despite the fact that Gimmestad actually adopted the wording of the rule used in a 
11
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However, Gimmestad also pointed out that: 
It should be clear by now that the phrase ‘attractive 
nuisance’ indicates no special departure or exception 
from the ordinary run of negligence cases.  It is but a 
convenient phrase to designate one sort of case within the 
ordinary rule that one is liable for injury resulting to 
another from failure to exercise, for the protection of the 
injured child, the degree of care commensurate with and 
therefore demanded by the circumstances.53
Other cases made it clear that the child trespasser standard 




In other words, all child entrants under the categorical 
approach were owed the same standard of care as was owed in 





tentative draft of the First Restatement.  Gimmestad, 194 Minn. 531, 536, 261 N.W. 
194, 196 (1935) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 209 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 
1929)).  See also Hughes v. Quarve & Anderson Co., 338 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 
1983) (explaining that the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted section 339 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts in Gimmestad). 
  In addition, when a child was in the vicinity, “a 
 53. Gimmestad, 194 Minn. 531, 536, 261 N.W. 194, 196.  See also Doren v. NW. 
Baptist Hosp. Ass’n, 240 Minn. 181, 186, 60 N.W.2d 361, 365 (“This court has 
discharded [sic] the distinction between ‘attractive nuisance’ cases and other 
negligence cases.”); Heitman v. Lake City, 225 Minn. 117, 30 N.W.2d 18 (1947) 
(noting that the distinction between attractive nuisance cases and regular 
negligence cases has been discarded). 
 54. Peterson v. Richfield Plaza, Inc., 252 Minn. 215, 221, 89 N.W.2d 712, 717 
(1958) (applying Restatement section 339 to child licensee, since licensees were 
owed at least as much as trespassers, “and probably some more”); Meagher v. Hirt, 
232 Minn. 336, 339, 45 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1951) (“Our previous decisions in cases 
of this kind make it clear that this duty to exercise due care to eliminate 
conditions on real property which are hazardous to children is the same . . . 
whether the child is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser.” (citing Gimmestad, 194 
Minn. 531, 536, 261 N.W. 194, 196 (1935))). 
 55. Gimmestad, 194 Minn. 531, 261 N.W. 194; Meagher, 232 Minn. 336, 45 
N.W.2d 563.  The Minnesota Supreme Court further explained this in Hocking v. 
Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Railway Company: 
We think [the Gimmestad rule] results in a more equitable division of 
community interests and adopts a standard by which this court can 
measure and determine the extent of the landowner’s liability.  Since 
particular facts more determinative than others constantly vary 
predictions as to liability generally, the most that can be done in good 
conscience by this court is to lay down a rule of law that in good 
judgment and common sense will aid in determining what fact situation 
comes within the presently adopted rule. 
263 Minn. 483, 490, 117 N.W.2d 304, 309 (1962). 
12
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degree of vigilance commensurate with the greater hazards created 
by his presence [was] required of a person to measure up to the 
standard of what the law requires as reasonable care.”56
For example, in Paulson v. Jarmulowicz,
  Essentially, 
then, child entrants were afforded a greater degree of care than 
any other class of entrants. 
57 decided in 1964, the 
supreme court affirmed a jury’s finding of negligence where a child 
guest was seriously burned by hot coffee.58  The two-and-a-half year-
old child had been “helping” set the table for dinner when he fell 
off a chair and onto a coffee percolator’s cord, which had been 
precariously strung across an empty area next to the chair.59  The 
coffee percolator fell onto the child, spilling its scalding contents 
upon him.60  The trial court had instructed the jury that the 
applicable standard of care was reasonable care, not the standard 
owed to adult licensees.61
The supreme court found there was no absence of actionable 
negligence—meaning there was no breach of duty—as a matter of 
law.
 
62  The case had been properly submitted to, and decided by, 
the jury.63  Although the court believed negligence could not be 
based on “a duty of care inconsistent with accepted patterns of 
behavior in the home,”64 the court found that the particular facts of 
Jarmulowicz were enough to support the jury’s finding of 
negligence.65
Thus, the duty owed to child entrants under pre-Peterson 
premises liability law was not limited, as it was with respect to adult 
entrants, by the categories of trespasser, licensee, and invitee.  All 
 
 
 56. Paulson v. Jarmulowicz, 268 Minn. 280, 282, 128 N.W.2d 763, 764 (1964).  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 281, 128 N.W.2d at 764. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  In declining to use the obviousness of the danger as a basis for 
dismissing an action against such a young child, the court noted “[t]he words of 
the [adult] instruction relating to the knowledge of the licensee and to the 
possible efficacy of a warning are obviously inapplicable where the licensee, as 
here, is only 2 1/2 years of age.”  Id. at 281, 128 N.W.2d at 764. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 284, 128 N.W.2d at 765. 
 64. Id. at 282, 128 N.W.2d at 765. 
 65. Id.  The characteristics supporting a finding of negligence included the 
fact that the grandmother knew the percolator was full of hot coffee, that she knew 
the grandson’s parents were in another part of the apartment, that she knew the cord was 
near where the grandson was standing on a chair, and that the accident was easily 
preventable.  Id. at 283, 128 N.W.2d at 765. 
13
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child entrants were owed the same child trespasser standard of 
care, which was equivalent to the regular negligence standard of 
reasonable care. 
2. Peterson v. Balach 
In 1958, California became the first state to abolish the 
categorical approach to premises liability in the seminal case of 
Rowland v. Christian.66  The California Supreme Court opted 
instead to treat landowner liability under the principles of ordinary 
negligence law.67
In 1972, Minnesota abolished the distinction between licensees 
and invitees in Peterson v. Balach.
   
68  In explaining its decision, the 
court noted how it had to continually “twist the rules in order to 
arrive at a just result”69 and that tempering the rigid categories by 
creating exceptions was hardly any better, “because it create[d] a 
rigid system which [was] at the same time complex, confusing, 
inequitable, and, paradoxically, nonuniform.”70
The court held that from then on, the duty owed to all 
licensees and invitees was “no more and no less than that of any 
other alleged tortfeasor, and that duty is to use reasonable care for 
the safety of all such persons invited upon the premises, regardless 




 66. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
  The court listed a number of 
 67. Id. at 568.  Explaining its reasoning behind abolishing the common law 
categories, the court stated: 
A man’s life or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the law 
nor a loss [sic] less worthy of compensation under the law because he has 
come upon the land of another without permission or with permission 
but without a business purpose. . . .  The common law rules obscure 
rather than illuminate the proper considerations which should govern 
determination of the question of duty. 
Id. 
 68. 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972).  The court, however, retained the 
trespasser category, noting that there is “good reason” for this distinction and 
eliminating it would be a “drastic step.” Id. at 165, 199 N.W.2d at 642. 
 69. Id. at 168, 199 N.W.2d at 644. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 647.  The court further noted that  
the status of the injured person might well be a factor which the 
factfinders could consider.  The principal issue, however, will not be “in 
what category shall we place the injured person” but, rather, “did the 
owner (or the person responsible) act as a reasonable person in view of 
the probability of injury to persons entering upon the property” whether 
they be licensees of [sic] invitees. 
Id. 
14
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factors that might be taken into account when determining 
liability, which included “the circumstances under which the 
entrant enters the land (licensee or invitee); foreseeability or 
possibility of harm; duty to inspect, repair, or warn; reasonableness 
of inspection or repair; and opportunity and ease of repair or 
correction.”72
Although some statements in Peterson may somewhat 
ambiguously imply that the judge must make an initial 
determination as to whether a duty exists at all,
  
73 elsewhere in the 
decision, as well as in cases decided soon after Peterson, it was 
clarified that a duty exists solely in virtue of the landowner-entrant 
relationship.74  The analysis of premises liability cases, then, was 
normally to start with breach.75
3. Post-Peterson Premises Liability in Minnesota 
 
Peterson may have attempted to clarify premises liability law—
but this was hardly the result.  Before Peterson, Minnesota courts 
usually assumed the existence of a duty, and quickly went on to 
discuss whether the landowner had breached his duty (or “was 
negligent”).76
 
 72. Id. at 175, 199 N.W.2d at 648. 
  Likewise, just after Peterson, courts deciding premises 
 73. The most ambiguous statement may have been the following: “After all 
pertinent factors are considered, depending upon the circumstances of each case, 
the factfinders will be asked to determine if liability exists for damages sustained 
by an entrant.”  Id. at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 648.  This statement does not say who 
considers all of the pertinent factors, but other parts of the decision indicate it 
meant the jury.  See id.  The indication of a subsequent determination as to liability 
may refer to the jury’s determination on causation. 
 74. E.g. Adee v. Evanson, 281 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Minn. 1979) (listing the 
factors from Peterson as factors for determining whether the defendant met the 
duty of reasonable care). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Landowner liability cases decided before Peterson tended to analyze cases 
in terms of breach (“actionable negligence” or “negligence”), rather than in terms 
of duty, indicating a duty was generally assumed to exist.  E.g., Dempsey v. 
Jaroscak, 290 Minn. 405, 188 N.W.2d 779 (1971) (reversing trial court’s finding of 
no actionable negligence as a matter of law); Peterson v. W. T. Rawleigh Co., 274 
Minn. 495, 144 N.W.2d 555 (1966) (upholding jury’s finding of negligence); 
Paulson v. Jarmulowicz, 268 Minn. 280, 128 N.W.2d 763 (1964) (upholding jury’s 
finding of negligence); Sandstrom v. AAD Temple Bldg. Ass’n, 267 Minn. 407, 127 
N.W.2d 173 (1964) (affirming trial court’s finding of no negligence as a matter of 
law); Behrendt v. Ahlstrand, 264 Minn. 10, 118 N.W.2d 27 (1962) (affirming jury’s 
finding of negligence); Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495, 83 N.W.2d 252 (1957) 
(finding no negligence as a matter of law); Johnson v. Evanski, 221 Minn. 323, 22 
N.W.2d 213 (1946) (upholding jury’s finding of negligence). 
15
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liability cases continued to assume the existence of the landowner’s 
duty to exercise reasonable care.77
By the 1990s, however, the courts had begun to treat 
landowners the same as “any other alleged tortfeasor” in 
Minnesota—by initially launching a full scale inquiry into whether 
the landowner owed any duty in the first place.
  
78  The definitive 
turning point in this metamorphosis was Barber v. Dill,79 decided by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1995.80  Failing to even cite 
Peterson, the supreme court in Barber declared that the “[a]nalysis of 
a cause of action against a landowner for negligence begins with an 
inquiry into whether the landowner, Dill, owed the invitee, William 
Barber, a duty.”81  By allowing for a distinct duty inquiry in every 
case, Barber restored much of the gate-keeping power that judges 
had lost after Peterson.  In fact, because they were not even 
restrained by the common law categories, Barber probably gave 
judges even more gate-keeping power than they had under the 
categorical approach.  Unsurprisingly, Barber quickly became one 
of the most cited cases in Minnesota premises liability law.82
After Barber was decided, the main standard for determining 
the existence of a duty on the part of a landowner became the 




 77. Cases decided just after Peterson continued to determine liability on the 
basis of breach of duty, assuming that a general duty of reasonable care existed on 
the part of the landowner.  E.g., Bisher v. Homart Dev. Co., 328 N.W.2d 731 
(Minn. 1983) (holding no actionable negligence as a matter of law); Adee v. 
Evanson, 281 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 1979) (holding that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury that a store owner has no duty to warn a customer of risks 
about which the customer had present knowledge and present realization); 
Gaston v. Fazendin Const., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1978) (holding that 
construction company had continuing duty to keep construction premises safe for 
business visitors). 
  
 78. The view that landowner liability cases start with an inquiry into whether 
any duty existed in the first place is the settled view of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court today.  Baber v. Dill, 531 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 1995).  See also Louis v. 
Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 2001) (holding that premises liability cases 
start with an inquiry into whether the landowner owed the entrant a duty); 
Sutherland v. Barton, 570 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 1997) (holding landowner had no 
duty to warn about obvious dangers). 
 79. 531 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 1995); see also Steenson, supra note 32, at 
1304, 1316 (explaining the line of analysis in Minnesota premises liability cases 
after Barber). 
 80. Barber, 531 N.W.2d at 495. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Steenson, supra note 32, at 1305. 
 83. Barber, 531 N.W.2d at 495. See also Marks, supra note 20, at 4 (noting that 
the open and obvious danger rule was “historically premised on the 
16
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In addition, the factors which Peterson had listed for determining 
breach became factors for the judge to use when determining 
duty.84  Thus, the court’s initial inquiry into the duty now 
considered: (1) whether the landowner owed the entrant a duty of 
reasonable care, in light of the factors listed in Peterson; (2) whether 
the danger was known or obvious to any person exercising ordinary 
perception, intelligence, and judgment; (3) if the danger was 
known or obvious, whether the landowner could foresee harm to 
the entrant despite the obviousness.85
Duty—which Peterson had intended to be practically a non-
question—now swallows the majority of the analysis in premises 
liability cases. 
  
a. Child Entrants Post-Peterson 
Although there have only been a limited number of cases 
involving child entrants decided since Peterson, it does not appear 
that children have been immune to the curious gate-keeping frenzy 
that adult entrants have been subjected to.  For example, courts 
have used the open and obvious danger rule to limit liability for 
injuries to children, but generally only older children.86
One notable limitation on liability to child entrants came in 
Sirek v. State Department of Natural Resources,
 
87 decided in 1993.  
There, a young girl was hit by a van while crossing a freeway 
adjoining a state park.88  Statutory immunity explicitly limited the 
state’s duty to park entrants to the duty owed to trespassers.89
 
unforeseeability of any risk of harm . . . .”). 
  The 
 84. Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 319 n.4 (Minn. 2001) (citing Peterson v. 
Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174 n.7, 199 N.W.2d 639, 648 n.7 (1972)) (“Other factors 
to consider in assessing the duty owed include (1) the foreseeability or possibility 
of harm; (2) the duty to inspect, repair, or warn; (3) the reasonableness of 
inspection or repair; and (4) the opportunity and ease of repair or correction.”).  
See also Steenson, supra note 32, at 1310 (noting that the court in Louis curiously 
appears to make the factors listed in Peterson relevant to the duty determination, 
rather than the breach determination). 
 85. For an even more detailed account of the principles governing premises 
liability law in Minnesota after Barber, see Mike Steenson, Peterson v. Balach, Obvious 
Dangers, and the Duty of Possessors of Land in Minnesota, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1281 (2008). 
 86. E.g., Sperr v. Ramsey County, 429 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) 
(denying recovery to an eleven-year-old child who was injured when he ran into a 
low hanging tree due to the obviousness of the danger). 
 87. 496 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 1993). 
 88. Id. at 808. 
 89. Id.  The relevant part of this statute reads: 
17
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issue, then, was whether the child trespasser standard or the adult 
trespasser standard applied to the child injured in Sirek.90
The supreme court found that the adult trespasser standard 
applied.
  
91  Because the park was only accessible by car, children 
were not expected to be in the park unsupervised; and “[w]hen 
small children are being watched by their parents, or entrusted 
persons in supervision, landowners may be relieved of a duty to 
warn them of or remove dangerous instrumentality [sic] the 
danger from which is apparent;”92 and in addition, “if a child is too 
young chronologically or mentally to be ‘at large,’ the duty to 
supervise that child as to obvious risks lies primarily with the 
accompanying parent.”93  Holding otherwise would be against 
public policy, the court explained, because it “would require the 
‘childproofing’ of vast areas of state parks,” and thereby destroying 
the parks’ naturalness.94
In Johnson v. Washington County,
 
95 the supreme court found 
Sirek applicable to a child who drowned in a man-made swimming 
pond in a county park, despite the fact children were known to be 
at the pond unsupervised.96  The court found that Sirek still barred 
the application of the child trespasser standard because the child in 
Johnson was, in-fact, under the supervision of adults when the 
accident occurred.97
i. The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Broad Use of Sirek v. 
State Department of Natural Resources 
   
The court of appeals read the holding in Sirek much more 
 
Subd. 3. Exclusions. . . . the legislature declares that the state and its 
employees are not liable for the following losses: . . .(h) a loss involving 
or arising out of the use or operation of a recreational motor vehicle, as 
defined in section 84.90, subdivision 1, within the right-of-way of a trunk 
highway, as defined in section 160.02, except that the state is liable for conduct 
that would entitle a trespasser to damages against a private person . . . 
Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 3(h) (2009) (emphasis added). 
 90. Sirek, 496 N.W.2d at 809. 
 91. Id. at 811. 
 92. Id. (quoting Strode v. Becker, 564 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)). 
 93. Id. (quoting Salinas v. Chicago Park Dist., 545 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1989)). 
 94. Id. at 811. 
 95. 518 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 1994). 
 96. Id.  The court found that the principle in Sirek also applied to county 
parks, because “the immunity statutes are essentially identical and the policy 
considerations are the same.”  Id. at 599. 
 97. Id. 
18
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broadly than the supreme court had intended it to be.  The court 
even stretched it so far as to support practically contradicting 
holdings. 
For example, in Bredvick ex rel. Bredvick v. City of Morris,98 the 
court of appeals used Sirek to deny application of the child 
trespasser standard where a child who was not accompanied by 
adults drowned in a man-made swimming pond.99  The court noted 
the outcome in Johnson, but found that because government-
employed lifeguards had been on duty when the accident occurred, 
the child trespasser standard was likewise inapplicable.100
Yet, in Fear v. Independent School District 911,
 
101 the court of 
appeals found that the child trespasser standard did apply when a 
child was injured while under the supervision of a government-
employed school teacher.102
The court of appeals came up with a number of other curious 
holdings using Sirek.  In Habeck v. Ouverson, the court found the 
child trespasser standard applied where a child was run over by a 
tractor at a county fair, since the child’s parents were elsewhere on 





 98. No. C1-01-1110, 2002 WL 171713, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2002). 
  In Stiele ex rel. Gladieux v. City of Crystal, 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  As government employees, the lifeguards enjoyed discretionary 
immunity for any accidents that occurred while performing their prescribed 
duties.  This created a wonderful loophole for the state: by simply employing 
people to supervise, the state could relieve itself from any possible liability under 
the child trespasser standard—no matter how well those employees carried out 
their prescribed duties.  See id. 
 101. 634 N.W.2d 204, 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).   
 102. Id. at 214.  The court of appeals explained the wonderfully circular 
reasoning behind this decision as follows: 
[T]he children were allowed to play on the snow piles during recess with 
school district employees present, and therefore the children arguably 
would not have realized the risk of injury involved.  While there was 
supervision during recess, similar to cases applying [the adult trespasser 
standard], the facts of this case are more directly analogous to [the child 
trespasser standard], the successor to the attractive nuisance doctrine.  
We have children playing during recess on a playground that has snow 
piles that attract their attention, and they are not prohibited from 
playing on them.  The supreme court has stated that school districts have 
a duty of reasonable care to their students.  Absent case law applying [the 
adult trespasser standard] to school settings, we conclude that [the child 
trespasser standard] is more appropriate and shall be applied at trial.   
Id. (citation omitted).  Liability was not dismissed in this case on the basis of 
official immunity, due to insufficient evidence.  Id. at 216. 
 103. 669 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
19
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the court of appeals found the child trespasser standard did not 
apply to a child injured in a city park, because any child allowed to 
be “at large” was expected to recognize the danger in that case.104  
In Warman v. Gaber, the court found the child trespasser standard 
inapplicable where a child guest was injured jumping on a family 
friend’s trampoline, because the child’s mother was present when 
the injury occurred.105
The Minnesota Supreme Court had not intended Sirek to be 
read so broadly.
  All of these cases cited Sirek as the primary 
support for their holdings. 
106
III. FOSS V. KINCADE 
  However, it had not corrected the court of 
appeals’ sporadic misuse of Sirek either—at least not until 2009. 
A. Facts 
On October 15, 2003, Peggy Foss went to visit the new home of 
her close friend, Stephanie Kincade.107  Accompanying Peggy was 
her nine-year-old daughter and three-year-old son, David Foss, Jr.—
an active boy with a history of climbing furniture.108  Peggy had 
caught David climbing a bookcase in her home a few months 
earlier, and she and her husband had to warn David not to climb 
furniture on many other occasions.109  Stephanie knew about 
David’s activity level, and characterized him as even more active 
than her own active young son.110
The Kincades had just moved into their new home two weeks 




 104. 646 N.W.2d 251, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).  The child was eleven-years 
old, and was injured when he jumped off a fence onto a “three-to-four-foot tall 
metal signpost.” Id.  He appeared only to have suffered relatively minor injuries.  
See id. at 253. 
  Many rooms 
 105. No. C3-01-1755, 2002 WL 453282, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2002).  
The court further found that the child trespasser standard was inapplicable 
because the injured child’s family also had a trampoline, and the child and her 
mother were well-aware of the dangers involved.  Id. 
 106. See Canada ex rel. Landy v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 505 (Minn. 1997). 
 107. Foss ex rel. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn. 2009). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Respondents’ Brief and Appendix at 3, Foss ex rel. Foss v. Kincade, 746 
N.W.2d 912 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (No. A07-0313). 
 110. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 2, Foss, 746 N.W.2d. 912 (No. A07-
0313).   
 111. Respondents’ Brief at 2, Foss, 746 N.W.2d. 912 (No. A07-0313). 
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were empty of furniture and the house was strewn with boxes.112  
During the visit, Stephanie and Peggy were talking in the kitchen 
when David, his older sister, and one of the Kincade children went 
into a side bedroom a few feet away.113  In the side bedroom, on a 
carpeted floor, was a six-foot tall, three-foot wide, empty, unsecured 
bookcase.114
A minute or so later, the mothers heard a loud bang.
  
115  They 
quickly went to the side bedroom and saw the bookcase on the 
floor and two of the children standing there—but David was 
nowhere to be seen.116  The two mothers picked the bookcase up 
and found David underneath it.117  He was bleeding and turning 
blue.118  An ambulance rushed David to the hospital where he 
underwent several invasive surgical procedures.119  He suffered 
serious head injuries, permanent disfiguration to the left side of his 
face, and a possibility of future eye complications.120
Peggy had not been aware of the bookcase or its unsecured 
condition.
 
121  Although Stephanie knew that David was an active 
boy, no one had ever told her about his specific propensity to climb 
bookcases.122  Stephanie had not considered the bookcase a hazard 
to her own three children.123
David’s father brought an action against the Kincades in 
September 2005, claiming that their negligent failure to secure the 
bookcase caused David’s injuries.
  
124  The Kincades argued that they 
had no duty to prevent the accident in the first place.125
 
 112. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 319. 
 
 113. Respondents’ Brief and Appendix  at 2, Foss, 746 N.W.2d 912 (No. A07-
0313).  Notably, neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court mentioned 
how close the side bedroom was in relation to where the mothers were when the 
accident occurred.  Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 319; Foss, 746 N.W.2d at 913. 
 114. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 319. 
 115. Respondents’ Brief and Appendix at 2, Foss, 746 N.W.2d. 912 (No. A07-
0313). 
 116. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 1, Foss, 746 N.W.2d 912 (No. A07-
0313). 
 117. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 319. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Respondents’ Brief and Appendix at 2, Foss, 746 N.W.2d 912 (No. A07-
0313).   
 122. Id. 
 123. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 319. 
 124. Id. at 320. 
 125. Id.  
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B. The Trial Court: No Duty Because the Danger was Open and Obvious 
to Peggy Foss 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Kincades, holding that they owed no duty to secure the bookcase 
because the danger was open and obvious to Peggy Foss, and the 
accident was therefore not reasonably foreseeable.126
Foss appealed. 
 
C. Court of Appeals: No Duty Because the Accident was Not Reasonably 
Foreseeable—Particularly Because of Mother’s Presence 
The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for the 
Kincades, but rejected the application of the open and obvious 
danger rule.127  The fact that the danger was open and obvious to 
Peggy Foss was irrelevant; the real issue was whether the Kincades 
owed a duty directly to David.128
The court went on to make two more holdings.  First, the court 
of appeals held that the child trespasser standard did not apply in 
this case, based on Sirek ex rel. Beaumaster v. Department of Natural 
Resources.
  
129  In Sirek, the child trespasser standard was inapplicable 
because children were not expected to be in the park 
unsupervised.130  Because David was not expected to be in the 
Kincade home unsupervised, the child trespasser standard was 
likewise inapplicable.131
Second, the court of appeals held that the Kincades were not 




 126. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 3–4, Foss, 746 N.W.2d 912 (No. A07-
0313).   
  The 
presence of Peggy Foss was central to the court’s holding, because 
“the paramount duty to provide for a child’s safety rests with that 
child’s parents and cannot be delegated merely by entering the 
 127. Foss, 746 N.W.2d at 913. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 496 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 1993). 
 130. Id. at 811. 
 131. Foss, 746 N.W.2d at 914–15 (“[T]he supreme court has also held that the 
Restatement standard does not apply to children injured while in the company of 
their parents in areas where one would not expect to find unaccompanied 
children.”) (citing Sirek v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 496 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Minn. 
1993).  The court found that “at three years of age, David could not be expected 
to enter the Kincades’ home on his own, nor was he of an age ‘to be allowed at 
large.’”  Id. (quoting Sirek, 496 N.W.2d at 811). 
 132. Id. at 917. 
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home of another.”133  This principle was also borrowed from 
Sirek.134  Hence, under all the circumstances—but particularly 
because of the presence of Peggy Foss—the court of appeals found 




D. The Supreme Court: No Duty Because It Was Not Reasonably 
Foreseeable that Any Guest Would Attempt to Climb the Bookcase 
The supreme court affirmed summary judgment for the 
Kincades—but specifically rejected any application of Sirek or any 
argument based on the presence of Peggy Foss.136
First, the court pointed out that David was not a trespasser, 
and in light of the decision in Peterson v. Balach, was owed a greater 
duty than that owed to a trespasser.
  
137  “[A]lthough the child 
trespasser standard may set the minimum standard of care,” the 
court stated, “the standard of care applicable to a child injured on 
a landowner’s premises is the general duty of reasonable care.”138
Next, the court turned to the separate issue, framed with a 
quotation from Peterson v. Balach, of “whether the harm to David 
implicated the Kincades’ duty ‘to use reasonable care for the safety 
of all such persons invited upon the premises, regardless of the 
status of the individuals.’”
 
139
The supreme court rejected the court of appeals’ use of Sirek 
to limit the Kincades’ duty based on the presence of Peggy Foss.  
Sirek involved a child injured in a state park—it presented issues 
dealing with the state’s statutory immunity and the duty owed to a 
trespasser.
  
140  Here, there was no issue of statutory immunity, and 
David was not a trespasser.141
 
 133. Id. 
  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 917 (quoting Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 
924 (Minn. 1986)). 
 136. Foss ex rel. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009). 
 137. Id. at 321 (citing Szyplinski ex rel. Szyplinski v. Midwest Mobile Home 
Supply Co., 308 Minn. 152, 155–156, 241 N.W.2d 306, 309 (1976)).  But see infra 
note 163. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. (quoting Peterson ex rel. Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 
N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972)). 
 140. Sirek v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 496 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 1993).  
 141. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 322.  Although these reasons may seem somewhat 
arbitrary for not extending the basic premise that parent’s have the paramount 
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The supreme court stressed that the Kincades’ duty to provide 
reasonably safe premises was completely independent from Peggy 
Foss’s duty to supervise David.142  These duties were owed directly 
to David, and one duty could not extinguish the other.143  Instead, 
how much each person was at fault in causing the accident was to 
be decided under the rules of comparative negligence. 144
Ultimately, the supreme court held that the Kincades had no 
duty to protect David from the bookshelf because it was not 
reasonably foreseeable that anyone would attempt to climb it.
 
145 
Although foreseeability is usually decided by a jury, the issue can be 
decided by the court if it “is clear”—and in this case, the issue was 
“clear.”146
The court explained that reasonably foreseeable meant 
“objectively reasonable to expect,” and “objectively reasonable to 
expect” meant the accident was not “too remote to create 
liability.”
  
147  Therefore, the Kincades had no duty to secure the 
bookcase because expecting that guests would try to climb it was 
“too remote to create liability.”148  Bookcases are common 
household items just like lamps.149  Even though a three-year-old 
child may conceivably pull a lamp onto himself and sustain injury, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court would not expect a homeowner to 
bolt down every lamp in her home before inviting a child in to 
visit.150
 
duty to protect their children, the fact that the legislature stated liability only 
existed where a trespasser could recover, and that the courts must pay total 
deference to the legislature’s laws, probably account for the narrowness of the 
holding in Sirek.  See Sirek, 496 N.W.2d at 809 (stating that under the Tort Claims 
Act, users of outdoor recreation systems are defined as trespassers for tort 
purposes and a child with an adult is held to general trespasser standards rather 
than child trespasser standards.  Therefore, in the absence of traps or hidden 
dangers where trial ended the state was not liable). 
  Hence, even though the Kincades knew it was possible for 
the unsecured bookcase to fall over, the fact that a child might try 
to climb the bookcase and thus cause it to fall over was still “too 
 142. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 322. 
 143. Id. (citing Canada ex rel. Landy v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 504–05 
(Minn. 1997)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. at 322–23. 
 147. Id. at 322. 
 148. See id.  
 149. See id. at 323. 
 150. Id. 
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remote to create liability.”151
However, the court noted that it was “not difficult to imagine a 
different set of facts in which a jury question as to foreseeability 
would arise.”
 
152  Had the Kincades known of David’s tendency to 
climb bookcases, they may have had a duty to secure the bookcase, 
“or at least . . . warn Peggy Foss of its unsecured condition.”153
1. Dissent of Justice Alan Page: Children Have a Well-Recognized 
Propensity to Climb 
 
Justice Page dissented, arguing that it was reasonably 
foreseeable as a matter of law that David might attempt to climb 
the bookcase.154  Justice Page noted the widely recognized 
propensity of young children to climb and intermeddle,155 which 
had been recognized by courts in several other jurisdictions.156  It 
had been recognized by Internet websites discussing child safety.157  
It had been recognized by Justice Page himself—a father and a 
grandfather.158  “[T]he court is simply wrong in holding that it was 
not ‘reasonably foreseeable that David would try to climb on the 
bookcase.’”159  Justice Page argued that the case should be reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings at the trial court level.160
IV. ANALYSIS 
  
While the supreme court’s decision in Foss v. Kincade clarifies 
 
 151. See id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 324. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. (quoting Amos v. Alpha Prop. Mgmt., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34, 39 (Ct. App. 
1999)) (“Surely anyone familiar with young children, especially two year-olds, is 
aware of their propensity to climb . . .”); Orr v. First Nat’l Stores, Inc., 280 A.2d 
785, 789 (Me. 1971) (observing that young children have a propensity to climb); 
Dunbar ex rel. Blair v. NMM Glens Falls Assocs. LLC, 693 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 (App. 
Div. 1999) (noting that children’s recognized propensity to climb made injury to 
child climbing on defendant’s transformer box foreseeable); Collentine ex rel. 
Collentine v. City of New York, 17 N.E.2d 792, 795 (N.Y. 1938) (holding that 
children’s well-known propensity to climb factored into the determination of 
foreseeability)). 
 157. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 324 (citing Household Safety: Preventing Injuries 
From Falling, Climbing, and Grabbing, http://kidshealth.org/parent/
firstaid_safe/home/safety_falls.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2009)). 
 158. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 324. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. 
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the narrowness of the holding in Sirek v. Department of Natural 
Resources, it clarifies little else.  After explaining why Sirek is not 
applicable, the court simply disposes of the case based on the 
magical concept of reasonable foreseeability.  The court’s four-
paragraph analysis of this issue cites only one other case, and only 
then to “define” the meaning of reasonably foreseeable.161
Instead of relying on clear legal principles, the court uses 
broad social policy arguments to support what dicta indicates is 
actually a very narrow holding.
  Indeed, 
there is not much legal precedent to cite to when what the court is 
actually doing is deciding a question of fact. 
162
A. A Return to Peterson v. Balach? 
  This will surely cause the case to 
be interpreted as standing for much more than intended.  After all, 
this is exactly what happened when the court used similar broad 
arguments of social policy for its narrow holding in Sirek. 
The supreme court’s decision gives centralized treatment to 
Peterson v. Balach.163  In fact, it gives more discussion to Peterson than 
any premises liability case in recent history, and perhaps even any 
case decided in the post-Peterson era.164  The court even seems to 
rely entirely on post-Peterson precedent, which is somewhat 
remarkable among recent premises liability cases in Minnesota.165
However, it is still not yet the time to break out the confetti 
 
 
 161. Id. at 322 (citing Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp. 
U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 1998)). 
 162. See id. at 323 (“It is not difficult to imagine a different set of facts in which 
a jury question as to foreseeability would arise.”). 
 163. 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972). 
 164. As of the date of this writing, Foss is the only case to have examined the 
Peterson holding to such an extensive degree (shown by Westlaw’s “four star” 
symbol, the highest level, indicating relevance and degree of discussion within the 
case). 
 165. See discussion supra Part II.C.  As a notable exception to relying on post-
Peterson precedent, the court cites Szyplinski ex rel. Szyplinski v. Midwest Mobile Home 
Supply Co., 308 Minn. 152, 155, 241 N.W.2d 306, 308 (1976), for the proposition 
that cases decided after Peterson clarified child licensees and invitees were owed 
greater care than child trespassers.  Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Minn. 
2009).  Although Szyplinski was decided after Peterson, its cause of action arose 
before Peterson, and it was therefore decided under the old categorical rules.  
Szyplinski, 308 Minn. at 155, 241 N.W.2d at 308.  It is also worth noting that despite 
not relying on pre-Peterson cases, most of the cases cited in Foss rest on other pre-
Peterson limitations to liability.  E.g. Barber v. Dill, 531 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 
1995). 
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and declare a return to the clarity originally intended by Peterson.166  
A closer look reveals that the supreme court is in fact still relying 
on its own conception of landowner liability, a much more 
conservative conception, and falsely imputing it to Peterson.167
B. What Foss Clearly Says: Two Points 
   
Foss clearly holds two things: first, the threshold for liability for 
injuries to child guests is reasonable foreseeability, not the child 
trespasser standard; and second, a landowner’s duty to child guests 
is not affected by the presence of a child’s parent.168  Both of these 
points work to overturn the court of appeals’ overly-broad reading 
of Sirek, and to retain the judge’s role as the ultimate gate-keeper to 
the court.169
1. The Threshold for Liability is Reasonable Foreseeability—Not the 
Child Trespasser Standard of Care 
 
Foss’s lawyers tried to argue that because David met all the 
elements for recovery under the child trespasser standard, and 
David was in fact entitled to an even greater duty than a trespasser, 
the Kincades must have owed him some duty.170  The supreme 
court conceded that the minimum standard of care was the child 
trespasser standard—but the question of whether any duty existed 
at all was an entirely separate matter, and it preceded any question 
about the standard of care.171
Foss’s lawyers were apparently operating under the belief that 
Peterson had created an existing duty of reasonable care solely in 
virtue of the landowner-entrant relationship.
 
172  This is what Peterson 
had originally intended, but obviously that is not how the 
Minnesota Supreme Court interprets Peterson now.173
 
 166. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
  The supreme 
 167. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 168. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322–23 (Minn. 2009). 
 169. Foss v. Kincade, 746 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn. App. 2008). 
 170. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 6–7, Foss v. Kincade, 746 N.W.2d 912 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (No. A07-0313).   
 171. See Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 321. 
 172. Appellants’ Reply Brief at 7, Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 
2009) (No. A07-0313) (“Appellant is not seeking the expansion of Minnesota tort 
law.  He simply seeks the ordinary application of that law, a body under which 
landowners owe an entrant a duty of care to act reasonably in making their 
premises safe.”). 
 173. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 322–23. 
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court even used words quoted from Peterson to frame the issue of 
whether there was a duty in the first place174—a proposition from 
Barber v. Dill,175 not Peterson176
It is worth pointing out that inquiring into whether a 
landowner owed any duty to a child guest would make no sense 
under the intended view of Peterson, the Third Restatement, or even 
under pre-Peterson landowner liability law.
. 
177  Under each of these 
views, the court would have assumed the Kincades owed David a 
duty of reasonable care.178  The main question would be whether 
the Kincades had breached that duty—a question of fact normally 
for the jury.  In Foss, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
instead reaffirmed the judge’s position as the ultimate gatekeeper 
to liability by retaining a separate and antecedent inquiry into the 
existence of a duty in the first place.179
2. A Landowner’s Duty to a Child Guest is Not Negated by the 
Presence of the Child’s Parent 
 
Perhaps Foss’s broadest holding is in the clarification that a 
landowner’s duty to child guests is not affected by the presence of 
the child’s parent.180  This point is backed by sound reasoning.  
Relieving the landowner of her duty because the child’s parent is 
present not only smacks of contributory negligence,181 but also 
imputes the negligence of the parent to the child.182
 
 174. Id. at 321. 
  These are two 
 175. 531 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 1995). 
 176. Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972).  
Peterson explicitly stated “the principal issue, however, will not be ‘in what category 
shall we place the injured person’ but, rather, ‘did the owner (or the person 
responsible) act as a reasonable person in view of the probability of injury to 
persons entering upon the property’. . . .”  Id. 
 177. See discussion supra Part II.A–B. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See discussion supra Part III.D..  
 180. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 322. 
 181. Under the long abandoned doctrine of contributory negligence, plaintiffs 
who had acted negligently in helping to cause their injury, no matter how slight in 
comparison to the defendant, were barred from all recovery.  See 4 FOWLER V. 
HARPER, ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 22.1 (3d ed. 2007).  The 
harshness of this rule led jurisdictions to adopt comparative fault, where the 
plaintiff’s recovery was only reduced by his percentage of fault in causing the 
injury that as determined by the jury.  Id. § 22.15.  Minnesota adopted comparative 
fault by statute in 1969.  1969 Minn. Laws 1069.  See also MINN. STAT. § 604.01 
(2009).  
 182. Mattson v. Minn. & N. Wis. R. Co., 95 Minn. 477, 488, 104 N.W. 443, 448 
(1905) (“[A child] is entitled to the protection of the law equally with persons who 
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big “no-no’s” under contemporary torts law. 183
You may ask, “is it not common sense that a landowner would 
be less precautious if a child was visiting with his mother as 
opposed to visiting without his mother?”  This may be true—but 
the affect of the mother’s presence is for the jury to consider in the 
context of breach or proximate cause—not for the judge to 
consider himself in the context of duty.
 
184
Although the court of appeals had the right intentions, its 
position could not work simply because it used the fact of the 
parent’s presence in as a basis for denying the existence of a legal 
duty.  It’s reliance on Sirek was misplaced—the supreme court only 
used the principle of the parents’ paramount duty to help justify 
not extending the state’s liability past what the legislature had 
intended it to be.
  The existence of a duty 
is a purely legal question.  Landowners owe an independent duty of 
reasonable care to any child guest on their land, no matter if that 
child is an orphan or accompanied by his entire extended family.  
The presence of other supervising adults only affects the 
circumstances—that is, the surrounding facts of the case which the 
jury must evaluate to determine if the landowner acted reasonably. 
185
 
have attained their majority, and to refuse him relief on the ground of his parents’ 
indifference or negligence would be to deny [his right] to him.  To impute to him 
negligence of others is harsh in the extreme, whether the negligence so imputed 
be that of his parents, their servants, or his guardian.”) (overruling Fitzgerald v. St. 
Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry. Co., 29 Minn. 336, 13 N.W. 168 (1882)). 
  Sirek did not extinguish any existing duty on 
 183. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967) 
(holding that parents’ negligence may not be imputed to her child); Peterson v. 
Richfield Plaza, Inc., 252 Minn. 215, 89 N.W.2d 712 (1958) (holding that mother’s 
negligent supervision could not bar child’s recovery for injures sustained when the 
child fell off a store’s ill-guarded balcony); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 5 cmt. a (2000) (“Correlatively, when a party would not be 
responsible as a defendant for the negligence of a third person, the negligence of 
the third person is not imputed to the party as a plaintiff.  Thus, . . . [t]he 
negligence of a parent is not, on that basis alone, imputed to a child.”); 4 MICHAEL 
K. STEENSON & PETER B. KNAPP, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES § 
28.15 (5th ed. 2009) (“The negligence of a parent is not imputed to the parent’s 
child and will not bar a child from recovering for injuries sustained through the 
negligence of a third party.”).  
 184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 8 cmt. a (2000) 
(“The factfinder assigns comparative percentages of ‘responsibility’ to parties and 
other relevant persons whose negligence or other legally culpable conduct was a 
legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”). 
 185. One of the basic principles of the United States’ system of checks and 
balances is that the judicial system must pay full deference to the legislature, 
except in cases where it would be unconstitutional.  United States v. Locke, 471 
U.S. 84, 95 (1985).  Hence, the supreme court had to be very careful not to extend 
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the part of the state.186
The limited use of the principle in Sirek may seem somewhat 
arbitrary in light of the case it was borrowed from—Strode v. 
Becker.
  There was no duty to begin with. 
187  Decided by the Illinois court of appeals, Strode involved a 
child guest who, while visiting a friend’s home with his father, stuck 
his fingers into the rotating spokes of a common household 
exercycle.188  The court stated that landowners are generally 
relieved from a duty to protect children from such obvious dangers 
when the child’s parent is present—but only when the parent is 
actually with the child, actively supervising him.189  Hence, the 
Illinois Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Strode in order to 
determine whether the father knew of the existence of the 
exercycle, or was in the same room when the child stuck his fingers 
into the exercycle’s rotating spokes.190
The principle in Strode is problematic for the same reason the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ use of it in Foss was—both used the 
argument based on the parent’s presence in the context of duty.
 
191  
As the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly pointed out, the 
presence of other people is totally irrelevant to the question of 
what the landowner’s duty to a specific entrant may be.192
C.What Foss Not-So-Clearly Says: The Issue of Reasonable Foreseeability “is 
Clear” 
 
The supreme court’s ultimate determination based on the lack 
of reasonable foreseeability raises more than a few eyebrows.  
Reasonable foreseeability, we are told, is a question for the jury 
unless the issue “is clear”;193 and where a very active, three-year-old 
child, well known to the homeowner, injures himself attempting to 
climb a latently tippy bookcase, the issue “is clear”.194
 
the state’s liability past what the legislature intended it to be under statutory 
immunity. 
  Yet, even 
Justice Page thinks it was reasonably foreseeable that David would 
 186. See Sirek v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 496 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 1993). 
 187. 564 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
 188. Id. at 876. 
 189. Id. at 880. 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. at 880; see also Foss ex rel. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 324 (Minn. 
2009). 
 192. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 322.  
 193. Id. at 323. 
 194. Id.  
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try to climb the bookcase.195
The short answer seems to be that the issue of reasonable 
foreseeability “is clear” whenever the court believes that it is.  In 
reality, negligence issues are hardly ever so clear.  By relying on the 
term “is clear,” judges make it seem as if they are adhering to some 
settled legal standard for determining foreseeability as a matter of 
law, when in fact they are not adhering to any standard at all.  
Dismissing negligence cases because the issue of reasonable 
foreseeability “is clear” is really just smoke in mirrors: it sounds 
warranted enough to get past most scrutiny, but really is just a cover 
for judges closing the gate to the jury without articulating more 
concrete reasons for doing so. 
  This begs the question: what standard 
is the court using to decide whether the issue “is clear?”  It cannot 
be the no-reasonable-jury standard required for finding no-breach 
as a matter of law—unless the court wanted to imply that twelve 
Justice Pages would make an unreasonable jury. 
The no duty determination in Foss exemplifies why basing no-
duty rulings on foreseeability can be so problematic.  The supreme 
court was adamant about deciding the case in the context of duty, 
but was also adamant about Peggy Foss’s presence being irrelevant 
to the question of duty.196
This is exactly why judges should not use a fact-dependent 
question like foreseeability to determine the abstract, legal 
question of duty.  When they do so, they must either be 
determining foreseeability in an intellectual vacuum, where clearly 
relevant facts must be ignored, or deciding questions of fact that 
are properly reserved for a jury.  In most cases, it is impossible to 
even tell which, if any, of the specific facts of the case the judge 
took into consideration when determining foreseeability.  Worst of 
all, these confusing and counter-intuitive determinations become 
precedent that future judges and lawyers are expected to follow. 
  Thus, the supreme court backed itself 
into a corner where it had to determine foreseeability in a make-
believe world where Peggy Foss did not exist.  In other words, it had 
to determine foreseeability based on a fact pattern other than the 
one actually at hand. 
When a case cannot be dismissed based on broad, articulated 
legal rules, the issue is not clear, and a jury determination is 
appropriate.  Juries may be unpredictable, but their determinations 
 
 195. Id. at 324 (Page, J., dissenting); see also discussion supra Part III.D.1. 
 196. Id. at 322. 
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do not create law.  Furthermore, recent studies show that juries 
usually reach the same conclusion in particular cases as the judge 
would have had he decided the case himself.197  One study found 
that judges would have ruled the same as juries in 78% of trials, 
and where the two differed, it was usually because the judge would 
have imposed liability where the jury did not.198
These observations are nothing new.
  If the jury is so 
likely to come to the same factual conclusion as a judge, why 
should judges have to circumvent the jury by creating empty, 
confused precedent with no-duty rulings based on the lack of 
foreseeability?   
199  These are exactly the 
reasons why the Third Restatement rejects the use of no-duty 
rulings based on the lack of foreseeability.200
V. CONCLUSION 
  These are exactly the 
reasons why the Minnesota Supreme Court should do so as well.  
Doing so will create greater clarity and stability to Minnesota law, 
while at the same time, force judges to articulate the reasoning 
behind their decisions, and ultimately lend greater legitimacy to 
the law.   
No-duty rulings due to the lack of foreseeability create 
precedent that is worthless at best, and downright unintelligible at 
worst.  The determination in Foss v. Kincade is no exception.  
Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision raises many more 
questions than it answers: How big is the realm of reasonably 
foreseeable harm when a three-year-old is present?201
 
 197. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 34 (2000) (pointing out that despite 
some views that the jury is a lawless threat, actual studies show juries tend to reach 
the same result the judge would have reached in a particular case).  See also 
Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1124 (1992); Michael J. Sakes, Public Opinion About the Civil Jury: Can realty Be 
Found in the Illusions?, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 221 (1998); LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 
406 (1930); Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors’ Treatment of 
Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327 (1998)). 
  Is it the same 
 198. ERIC HELLAND & ALEXANDER TABARROK, JUDGE AND JURY: AMERICAN TORT 
LAW ON TRIAL 50 (2006). 
 199. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 200. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7(a) (Proposed 
Final Draft  No. 1, 2005). 
 201. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 323 (Minn. 2009).  The court states 
“[w]hen dealing with a three-year-old child, the realm of possible harm is much 
larger than the realm of reasonably foreseeable harm.”  Id.  One would think that 
if the realm of possible harm was so large, the realm of reasonably foreseeable 
harm would also be rather large—but it does not seem this was the supreme 
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size as it is for an older child, or for an adult?  Will the common 
tendencies of three-year-olds ever be enough to create liability? 
The court indicated in dicta that the Kincades would have had 
a duty if they had actual knowledge of David’s specific propensity to 
climb bookshelves.202 So what if David had a tendency to pull lamps 
onto himself, as the court used in another illustration? 203 If Peggy 
then told Stephanie, “Hey, David has a tendency to pull lamps onto 
himself,” would Stephanie have a duty to bolt down all the lamps in 
her house?  Would Stephanie have to warn Peggy, “Watch out—I 
have lamps in almost every room in my home?”204
Articulating an acceptable, guiding rule that would provide a 
reliable answer to all of these questions would be difficult.  In fact, 
it may very well be impossible—but this does not mean that 
drawing the invisible line of “not reasonably foreseeable” is all that 
is left.  In fact, there is already a specific mechanism for deciding 
unclear cases just like Foss.  It involves an examination of the all the 
facts, done on a case-by-case basis, with input from a valid source on 
societal norms.  Best of all, it does not require the state’s supreme 
court to create confusing, vague, and counter-intuitive precedent. 
 
That mechanism is called the jury. 
 
court’s position in light of the outcome reached. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id.  
 204. Compare id. (“For example, we would not expect homeowners to bolt 
down their table lamps before inviting a three-year-old into their house, even 
though it is possible that such a child could be injured by pulling the lamp onto 
himself.”) with id. (“[I]f the Kincades had actual knowledge that David had a 
tendency to climb bookcases, the Kincades may have had a duty to secure the 
bookcase or at least warn Peggy Foss of its unsecured condition.”(emphasis 
added)). 
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